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The uncertain future of relations between the United States and Venezuela

The uncertain future of relations between the United States and Venezuela

With Nicolás Maduro kicking off a third term in Venezuela amid controversy over the lack of detailed records responding to his election victory, Donald Trump is preparing to assume the presidency of the United States for the second time. Trump’s binding to power promises to open a new chapter in the relationship between both countries, historically marked by tensions and addressed postures.

Although some analysts believe Trump will maintain his policy of “maximum presidency” in the face of the Maduro regime, others believe he may adopt a more pragmatic approach, seeking kudos that benefit the interests of other nations. The unknown persists, and the course I will take will depend on the decisions Trump will have to make during his investment.

Last week, amidst kilometers of Venezuelan protests against Maduro’s oath, Trump wrote a message on social networks recognizing his opponent Edmundo González Urrutia as the “elected president” of Venezuela. Furthermore, we further guaranteed the safety of González and opposing leader María Corina Machado. This gesture refers to the position of denying Maduro as a legitimate mandate, but questions have already arisen about the strategy that Trump will follow in his second mandate.

A first marked obligation for sanctions and confrontation

Relations between Washington and Caracas deteriorated significantly during Trump’s first term (2017-2021). Although sanctions on Venezuelan officials began during Barack Obama’s administration in 2015, Trump has stepped up economic measures against the Maduro regime.

In 2017, his government prohibited state banks from buying bonds issued by the Venezuelan government and Petróleos de Venezuela (Pdvsa), the oil state. Transactions with existing vouchers in the Venezuelan public sector are also limited, increasing financial pressure on the regime.

The situation worsened in 2019, amid a presidential election widely criticized by the international community and described as a “farce” by the then Secretary of State, Mike Pompeo. Washington recognized Juan Guaidó as Venezuela’s internal president and applied further sanctions to PDVSA, suspending commercial flights between both countries.

Maduro responded by severing diplomatic relations, giving state officials 72 hours to flee the country. Since then, the Embajada de Estados Unidos en Venezuela closed its doors and diplomatic operations moved to Bogota, Colombia, with the creation of a Unidad de Asuntos de Venezuela.

Trump’s dilemma in his second term

With his return to power, Trump will face a complex challenge in his policy toward Venezuela. Even if you have already recognized Edmundo González as president-elect, you will want to see whether you will choose to maintain a similar hard line as in your first obligation or whether you will seek a more transactional approach, as some experts suggest.

Maduro, for his part, has expressed his interest in improving bilateral relations. After Trump’s victory in the elections, the Venezuelan leader said he was facing a “new beginning”. During a program on state television VTV, he declared:

“This is a new beginning for us to start ganar-ganar. That they go well in the United States, they go well in Venezuela and always abogamos so that they go well in Latin America and the Caribbean”.

Michael Shifter, an international politics expert and professor at Georgetown University, believes Trump could explore ties with Maduro through a more pragmatic approach.

“The hard-line politics of the first term was a struggle, and he knows it,” Shifter said. “I guess I could look for timely answers, such as a migration, which allows us to deport Venezuelans who are in the United States illegally and present it as a log. In exchange, Maduro could get a boost from sanctions or new reversals.”

However, Marco Rubio’s designation as secretary of state suggests Trump may maintain a more confrontational posture. Rubio has been a fierce critic of the Maduro regime, describing him as a “criminal” who uses drug trafficking as a weapon against the United States. In 2022, Rubio asked Interpol to issue a red notice for Maduro’s capture, and in 2024 he called the Venezuelan elections a “fraud.”

A team divided between pragmatism and maximum pressure

The composition of Trump’s team appears to reflect a balance between those who favor a transactional approach and those who give in to maintain pressure on Maduro. Figures like Mauricio Claver-Carone and Christopher Landau, architects of the “máxima presión” policy in 2019, will fill lapsed roles in the administration.

Benigno Alarcón, director of the Centro de Estudios Políticos de la Universidad Católica Andrés Bello, believes that Trump has few options to change his posture towards Venezuela without contradicting his previous rhetoric.

“Based on his statements and the people in his environment, I can imagine that Trump is trying to make moves with Maduro,” Alarcón indicated. “Even on the obligatory primer, I don’t see the expected results, I don’t think it would lead him to adopt a policy inconsistent with his discourse”.

Alarcón also warns that whatever you did to Maduro could be counterproductive:

“The reason for Venezuelan emigration is the Maduro mism. Strengthening him in power will not solve the problem.”

What to expect in the next few years?

With Trump scheduled to take office on January 20, the decisions I make in the first months of his second term will be crucial to setting the pace of U.S.-Venezuela relations.

On the one hand, Trump could maintain his hard-line discourse, supported by figures like Rubio, and continue with sanctions and restrictive measures. On the other hand, I might opt ​​for a more transactional approach, trying to understand if you can show concrete results on topics such as migration or trade.

What seems clear is that regardless of which path he chooses, tensions between both countries will follow as a central issue in international politics. Trump will have to balance the expectations of his political base in the United States with the reality of Venezuela facing an unprecedented humanitarian and economic crisis.

Meanwhile, Maduro will seek to consolidate his domestic position and project an image of openness to dialogue, even if the chances of a real investigation between both leaders remain entangled. With a history of clashes and deep ideological differences, any change in the relationship between Washington and Caracas will require difficult concessions from both.

The future of this relationship will be marked by strategic decisions that could define not only the rumble of Venezuela, but also the map of the United States of Latin America in the coming years.

By Thomas Greenwood